LILEKS (James) Screedblog

Thursday, March 02 2006

Perhaps you’re confused by the so-called “Ports Deal” flap, which is rapidly reaching “imbroglio” status. At least in the Italian papers. Let us recap.

A British firm with the quaint and bygone name of Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation company which controlled some American ports, and staffed the docks with Beefeaters and fierce Gurka soldiers who shot intruders on sight. They sold their interests to a company run by someone named Ladina Bin Osam, located in the fictional nation of “Dubai,” which is actually located in a PO box in Tehran. The company immediately announced plans to rechristen the docks “Martyr’s Gangways” and convert all cargo ships into troop transports that would fling plague-infected suicide bombers from off shore by means of catapults. Supporters of the deal point out that “Dubai,” which is how “Dubya” is pronounced in Arabic, is actually a great ally of the US, , despite the fact that the country’s seal shows the Twin Towers on fire, with the words “Bingo!” written below in elegant script. Pressed for comment, President Bush noted that critics should “wad up a sock and swallow it,” and that he would veto any attempt to veto the deal – unless it included $903 billion in additional spending, in which case, let’s talk.

While you read that, six al-Qaeda agents cleared customs in Mexico with a liter of VX nerve gas masquerading as a 7-Up jug.

Well, no. Disregard everything written so far. For that matter, disregard everything that follows and cut right to the sense of Uneasy Acquiescence, which is where you’ll be in a few months no matter who says what. The Ports Deal, as it’s known, will probably go through after enough Congresspersons get the chance to model the latest fashions before the cameras, and harrumph enough in front of witnesses to make us all feel secure.

Your correspondent hated the deal when the news first broke, and has been somewhat mollified by the quantity of smart right-wing war-fiends who are not concerned. Generals Tommy Franks and Peter Pace are on board, and neither seem like the sort of person to mutter “oh, whatev” when the possibility of secret-agent penetration arises. The company will not be responsible for security; Customs, the Coast Guard, and Homeland Security will still have that job. And so you unclench.

But wait! The Coast Guard had concerns, according to a new memo. You reclench. A Coast Guard intelligence assessment, according to the AP, said “There are many intelligence gaps, concerning the potential . to support terrorist operations . . . The breadth of the intelligence gaps also infer potential unknown threats against a large number of potential vulnerabilities." Aw, dang.
But wait! Says the same AP story: “The Coast Guard said the concerns reflected in the document ultimately were addressed. In a statement, the Coast Guard said other U.S. intelligence agencies were able to provide answers to the questions it raised. ‘The Coast Guard, the intelligence community and the entire CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States) panel believed this transaction received the proper review, and national security concerns were, in fact, addressed," the Coast Guard said.

Expect more whipsawing in weeks to come. Meanwhile, what have we learned? 1. Dick Cheney’s hunting accident was not, as it turns out, the story of the century. 2. The inhumanly perfect Rovian spin-machine is not infallible. If they couldn’t see how would be a bombshell headline, they need to scrape the bubble juice off their glasses. 3. In order to keep moderate Arab regimes on our side, it is necessary to recognize the realities of the global economy, and if you don’t think Kuwait should run 100% of American refineries, you’re an isolationist and a racist to boot. 4. Everything important seems owned by mysterious guys in board rooms on the other side of the planet. 5. The opportunism of some politicians is boundless; some of the Democrat critics of the Ports deal, particularly those named Clinton, had no problem giving China the keys to the Panama Canal back in the nineties.

And finally: those six Al-Qaeda guys we mentioned are probably halfway to Houston by now.

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Below: earlier, ahem, less-informed and more excitable remarks.

Wednesday, February 22 2006

A few words on the Dubai Ports World imbroglio, written without pause or editing, which is probably just as well. Short version: the administration may have thought it was helping a Valuable Ally and probably a pal, end of story. But it plays like Bush defending eminent domain to condemn a neighborhood to build a mosque.

I don’t make predictions, because – well, who cares? You either repeat the conventional wisdom and hide with the herd when you’re wrong, or buck the prevailing opinions and get a reputation as a “maverick” when you’re wrong, again. Works for some. But if I had to make a prediction, I’d say this: the Dubai-ports fracas will become a flap, quickly swell into a firestorm, then become a debacle before settling into the history books as a “historic miscalculation” – providing the Republicans only lose the Congress. If they lose a city, it will be a “critical turning point.”

Do I expect the managers of the ports to start installing Al Qaeda operatives in key positions, so they can wave through all the containers with small nukes for national distribution? No. But such a scenario does not exact tax the imagination, which is why it’s such a stupendously bad idea.

It’s remarkably tone deaf. It’s possible that the Administration did some quiet polling, and asked the question “How much Arab control over American ports are you comfortable with,” and misinterpreted stunned silence as assent. It’s possible the Administration believed that this would be seen as outreach, an act of faith to solidify a Key Ally, and didn’t think there’d be much hubbub – but if that’s the case, it’s the best example of the Bubble Theory I’ve heard, and I’ve not heard much convincing evidence. Until now. The average American’s reaction to handing port control over to the UAE is instinctively negative, and for good reason. There are two basic reactions: We can’t do this ourselves? and We should trust them, why?

As for the first, the assertion that American firms were the lower bidder is unpersuasive, rather like saying that we should have outsourced the flight crew for the Enola Gay to Japanese nationals because they knew the terrain better. As for the trust issue, well, wanting port control to remain in American hands is not a matter of Arabiaphobia, any more than selling Boeing to China means you harbor deep hatred of Asians. Some things ought to be left in local hands. It seems absurd to have to make that argument in the first place. The UAE is not exactly stuffed stem to stern with pro-American individuals; the idea that the emirs will stand foursquare against infiltration by those who have ulterior motives is the sort of wishful thinking that makes buildings fall and cities empty. I’m not worried that some evil emir is putting a pinky to his monocled eye, and saying Mwah! at last I have them where I want them! I’m worried about the guy who’s three steps down the management branch handing off a job to a brother who trusts some guys who have some sympathies with some guys who hang around some rather energetic fellows who attend that one mosque where the guy talks about jihad 24/7, and somehow someone gets a job somewhere that makes it easier for something to happen.

That’s a lot of ifs and maybes. But I don’t want any ifs and maybes. You can't eliminate them all, of course, but I would rather we had a system devoted to worrying about ifs and maybes instead of adopting an official policy of Whatever.

We’re told we’re at war, and we reach back for the wartime memories we all saw in the movies and read in the novels: Yanks walking along fences with a dog, rifle on the shoulder, searchlight playing on the ground, stealthy foes ever at the perimeter. It was never that tight, of course; it was never that dramatic. But there were the constant imprecations to be vigilant, because peril lurked. That would have been undercut, perhaps, if the Roosevelt Administration had given port control to Franco.

Well, not the best analogy, perhaps. But the specifics don’t matter; arguments about the specific nature of the Dubai Ports World organization’s global reach and responsible track records don’t matter. Because it feels immediately, instinctively wrong to nearly every American, and that isn’t something that can be argued away with charts or glossy brochures. It just doesn’t sit well. Period. It’s one thing for an Administration to misjudge how a particular decision will be received; it’s another entirely to misjudge an issue that cuts to the core of the Administration’s core strength. That’s where you slap yourself on the forehead in the style of those lamenting the failure to request a V-8 in a timely fashion. Doesn’t matter whether it was a deal struck between the previous administrators and the UAE; that’s not how the issue will be seen. And it certainly doesn’t matter once the President gets all stern on the topic and insists he’ll veto any attempt to keep the deal from going through. At that point, millions of previously resolute supporters stand there with their mouths open, uttering a soft confused moan of disbelief.

On the good side: we’re probably done with Shotgungate, and the DailyKos people will start getting worried about dirty nukes smuggled in through the ports. On the dark side, for conservatives: woot, there it is – the politically inept, base-confounding, intuitively indefensible decision. Oh, it may be the right thing to do, in the end. Maybe you’re overreacting. Wait, study, read, reflect. But hope you don’t have to go on a cable show and defend it, because you’d feel greasy.

Advice to the administration: If you’re going to shoot yourself in the foot, don’t use a bazooka. You may aim for the pinky toe but there’s nothing left below the hip. The recoil should not be your first clue you grabbed the wrong gun.

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